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This paper tests the hypothesis that monopoly power of school districts allows bureau
cratic expansion and fosters poor academic performance in the public school system in
California. Evidence indicates that monopoly power is positively associated with
employment of administrator s and teachers, and therefore supports the bureaucratic
expansion hypothesis. While numbers of teachers do not in¯ uence performance meas
ures, numbers of administrator s are shown to positively aŒect performance ± results
that suggest that too many teachers, but too few administrators , are employed. While
bureaucracy theory may explain the resource misallocation, other reasons might
include rising public pressures on hiring teachers over administrators , spending equal
ization policies, and the weak California economy in the period under investigation .

I. INTRODUCTION
It is commonplace to blame poor education performance on
lack of teachers or funding, but it is uncommon to blame
poor performance on lack of administrators. A growing
public perception is that US public schools are increasingly
burdened by bureaucracies that sti¯ e creativity of teachers
through standardizatio n and control of their activities.
Over-expanded bureaucracies are also believed to crowdout funding that might be better allocated to teachers, equipment and other inputs in the production of education.
Despite appearances of growing support for this view, little
empirical evidence is available with which to assess whether
or not school bureaucracies have over-expanded . This paper
examines what role school bureaucracies play in the performance of the public school system of California, where
student performance or achievement is measured by SAT
(School Achievement Test) scores and dropout rates.
That performance is inversely related to bureaucrati c size
within an over-expanded public school system is one
hypothesis. A counter-hypothesi s is that bureaucracies
are too small and therefore their expansion would raise
performance. This could arise in various ways. If, for
instance, substantial public pressures to minimize numbers
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of administrators and shift resources to other endogenous
inputs such as teachers and other staŒ are present,
resources could be misallocated in the sense that too
many other resources are employed relative to administra 
tors. California has recently implemented class-size reduc
tion policies that, in eŒect, shift resources toward teachers
and away from other resources. While such reallocation
may raise performance, it is important to recognize that
public policy changes are not private market-driven as
would occur when pro® t-maximizing ® rms reallocate
resources due to competitive pressures. Rather, public policies are chosen within public or political markets, and, as
the public perceives that there are too many administra 
tors, pressures arise to reallocate resources away from
administrators and towards other inputs. Whether reallo
cation improves performance by allocating resources more
e� ciently is an empirical issue.
Resource misallocation might also arise when school districts or states experience signi® cant changes in school
populations, state budgets, or adverse economic environ
ments. California has experienced a dramatic rise in
student population ± over 1.2 million since 1983± 1984,
which represents more students than currently served by
42 other states.1 Moreover, during much of the 1990s
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California lagged behind most other states in output
growth which has signi® cantly reduced revenues for state
and local governments. These factors appear to have sig
ni® cantly impacted the public school system. While
spending-per-studen t was roughly at the US average in
1976, California averaged US$4724 per student in 1994±
1995, which was US$1170 less than the national average of
US$5894 and contributed to a national ranking of 42.2
Even under strong economic conditions it is debatable
that resources are e� ciently allocated in public markets,
but it becomes more doubtful during times of economic
distress. Although conditions may be temporary, the possi
bility remains that bureaucratic resources are too scarce
and their expansion would raise performance, even though
public pressure may result in further contraction.
These hypotheses are examined on a data set that includes
all school districts in California over 1992 and 1993. The
focus on California provides a rich and large data set to
examine the role that bureaucracy plays on academic per
formance. The public school system (primary and second
ary) is the nation’s largest with 1002 school districts,
employing over 410 000 employees, with over 11 000 admin
istrators, and servicing over 5.3 million pupils. Funding in
1996± 1997 was $32 billion. Over 12% of children in kinder
garten through grade 12 reside in California, or one of eight
US students in 1994± 1995. The focus on California also
provides for an empirical examination within a common
set of funding constraints. California’s Proposition 98 of
1988 guarantees a minimum level of state support for all
schools and is an important determinant of school spending
levels. As each state has its own budgetary institutions and
mandates, cross-state examination may incorrectly conclude
that variation in academic performance or resource employ
ment is caused by bureaucracy when that variation results
from diŒerences in budgetary institutions. Most states also
attempt to equalize across school districts on the basis of
income and past performance, but do so with diŒerent inten
sity, and therefore equalization eŒorts are also potentially
important factors that explain cross-state variation in
performance. This paper avoids these problems by empiri
cally testing hypotheses using data only on California and
therefore eliminates cross-state diŒerences in budgetary
institutions and equalization eŒorts that would otherwise
in¯ uence relationships between bureaucracy and perform
ance of public school systems.

II. BUREAUCRACY MODEL AND
PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC
E D U C A TI O N M A R K E T S
Bureaucrats, or administrators , are both substitutes of and
complements for other inputs in the production of educa
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tion. In their managerial role they allocate resources and,
to some degree, assume risk that eŒorts do not meet per
formance standards placed on them by elected politicians
and/or voters and parents. They are complements since
their productivity is linked with employment of other
inputs such as teachers, staŒ, and classrooms.
Administrators have substitutes since other employees
may also take on the managerial roles of decision-making
on various activities such as teaching methods and overall
policy-making. Administrators provide a vital function in
the production of education but, as with any scarce
resource, may be overused or underused relative to other
resources.
Optimality conditions for the e� cient allocation of
administrators follow from conventional production
theory that models production as a function of marginal
products of inputs, input costs, and budgets. Optimal allo
cations arise when marginal product-to-resourc e price
ratios are equal across inputs as developed in the standard
isoquant and iso-budget model of microeconomics. Inputs
are administrators, teachers, other staŒ, buildings, land
and other endogenous inputs that produce education.
Optimal levels of inputs for a given education budget
arise when reallocation that raises production without cost
ing more is impossible.
Some inputs such as parentage and socioeconomic char
acteristics are exogenous in the sense that public schools
cannot pick-and-choose students. However, these inputs
are important because they may aŒect productivity of
endogenous inputs such as teachers or administrators.
For instance, heterogeneous student bodies cause marginal
products of teachers and administrators to vary by school.
Similarly, input prices, as well as budgets, vary across
locations thus causing variation in optimal input ratios.
Optimal resource allocation will therefore vary across
locations and suggests that simple observation of variation
in student± teacher or administrator ± teacher ratios across
schools do not necessarily indicate varying degrees of
e� ciency.
Education in a monopolistic market
The growing literature on government monopoly suggests
that public school systems are characterized by a high
degree of monopoly power. Private competitive markets
are generally believed to allocate resources e� ciently, but
Niskanen’ s (1971) theory of bureaucracy predicts that
resources are not e� ciently allocated in public markets
that lack competition and control by sponsors such as
elected o� cials or parents in the case of education.
Bureaucracy theory predicts that, because pro® t maximiza
tion is not a goal of bureaus, other rewards are pursued. In
public education, rewards may include maximization of
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budgets, salaries and employees, as well as pursuit of
amenities such as vacation time, plush o� ces and attractive
classrooms. Academic performance is another possible
pursuit, but this direction would only be emphasized in
competitive settings and/or when administrators are eŒec
tively constrained by sponsors (parents or politicians) that
prefer this direction. At issue is the extent to which mon
opoly conditions allow administrators to pursue goals that
favour their interests over interests of those who want a
public school system that e� ciently delivers high perform
ance.
Within a public exchange model whereby voters/parents
and policymakers determine education policies, voters/
parents communicate via voice and exit options to school
administrators. 3 Voice options include voting and expres
sing views directly to administrators and exit options indi
cate the extent to which dissatis® ed parents may move their
children from one school to another as they search for
preferred education programmes. Exiting is a last resort,
as developed in Charles Tiebout’ s (1956) model of `voting
with-your-feet’, and exercised when parents conclude they
cannot eŒectively in¯ uence local policies through voice
options. The Leviathan model of Brennan and Buchanan
(1980) argues that credible threats of exit are an eŒective
means of maintaining or improving programme quality
because policymakers are better able to pursue selfinterests when few exit doors are available. With relatively
few competitors, the Leviathan model predicts that
administrators are able to pursue policies re¯ ecting their
narrow interests such as bureaucratic over-expansion , as
opposed to simply pursuing parental interests of high
quality education.
Public school systems in California oŒer limited exit
options. It might appear that choices are plentiful with
over 7700 public schools in over 1000 school districts and
57 counties, but parents are routinely assigned particular
schools within their districts.4 These `exclusive territories’
spawn local monopolies whereby parents must undertake
costly relocation if they send children to better schools,
even though moves may be just a short distance.
Exclusive territory arrangements limit exit options and,
according to the Leviathan model, allow academic per
formance to suŒer as administrators are freer to pursue
self-interests.
Financing of public education also discourages competi
tion from private schools since individual tax assignments
are mostly unrelated to whether one has school-age chil

dren or to numbers of children.5 This is simply a conse
quence of the ability-to-pay principal of taxation whereby
tax bills are not assigned on the basis of bene® ts received,
as well as attempts to tax third-part y bene® ciaries of public
education. Primary recipients of public education are there
fore essentially charged zero unit prices and stands in direct
contrast to private education where unit prices re¯ ect non
zero marginal (private) costs. Private education carries a
unit price that far exceeds the zero unit price of public
education and, as a result, public education dominates pro
vision of education as this price advantage keeps the pri
vate education market relatively small and perhaps not a
particularly strong competitive threat to public education.
Until school vouchers or other policies signi® cantly break
the price advantage, the public market will undoubtedly
continue to dominate the education market.6 Currently,
the public market controls over 90% of the market at the
primary and secondary level in the USA, as measured by
dollars spent on education.
A small private market in education indicates lack of
competition and may suggest signi® cant monitoring prob
lems for parents/taxpayers who are interested in high
academic performance. Niskanen (1971) argues that mono
poly conditions allow public employees to operate at rela
tively high levels of autonomy from sponsors when there
are high monitoring costs and lack of private market coun
terparts with which to make comparisons of such items as
costs and performance. Since relatively few school person
nel are elected, and given the autonomy that tenure oŒers
many teachers, sponsors are likely to ® nd oversight a rela
tively di� cult endeavour, especially when there are limited
private market counterparts with which to make compar
isons. Indeed, such conditions may make it extremely di� 
cult for sponsors to eŒectively assess whether arguments
for higher funding made by school administrators and
teachers’ unions stem from self-interested attempts to
over-expand or genuine attempts to improve educational
performance in least-cost manners.
California’ s system of shared taxation may also encou
rage monopoly power in the public school system.7 Local
school districts used to be mostly funded by local revenues,
but for the last 25 years funding has been dominated by
decisions made in the state capital of Sacramento.
Propositions 13 and 98, with the latter passed in 1988,
mandate minimum funding guarantees for kindergarten
through community colleges. Proposition 98 constraints
now account for roughly 80% of total funding. Perhaps
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the most important constraint is imposed by the Serrano v.
Priest ruling of 1972 in which the Supreme Court of
California mandated restructuring of the school ® nance
system to virtually eliminate spending diŒerences between
school districts on the basis of wealth. In eŒect, court rul
ings mandated that ® nance be tied to a system of shared
taxation whereby the state government was responsible for
collecting taxes from local governments and then returning
revenues to school districts on the basis of factors such as
numbers of students and redistribution in the direction of
poorer districts. This funding system limits abilities of local
o� cials to make local funding decisions and constrains the
ability of school districts to compete with one another on
the basis of how well they use local funds to deliver quality
school programmes.
Some school districts ± especially wealthy ones ± did not
like the system of shared taxation. Fischel (1989) argues
that Proposition 13 was caused by Serrano since it allowed
high property value school districts/counties to bypass
some of the redistribution required by Serrano.
Proposition 13 capped property tax rates and growth in
assessed value, reducing by 54% the amount of property
taxes available to fund services provided by cities, counties,
school districts, and other agencies.8 Silva and Sonstelie
(1995) ® nd that Serrano created some equalization across
school districts, but also contributed to a statewide decline
in average funding per student. The US General
Accounting O� ce (1997) concludes that California needs
to shift 35% more state funds from wealthy to poor or
middle-income districts in order to meet equalization cri
teria, with current imbalances resulting from wealthier dis
tricts raising supplemental fees and parental contributions
as well as political forces in the redistribution process.
California’s shared taxation system contributes to school
district monopoly power to the extent that it reduces exit
options of parents who are dissatis® ed with funding deci
sions of local school administrators. In eŒect, shared taxa
tion protects and increases monopoly positions of school
districts since it restricts inter-district competition on the
basis of taxation, thus eŒectively creating one large mon
opoly government from which parents cannot easily
escape, and according to the Leviathan view, to poor per
formance of public schools.
Implications of monopoly view
An implication of the monopoly view is that school admin
istrators have an interest in over-expanding that exceeds
their interest in improving educational performance. As
discussed above, over-expansion may take place in any
of the endogenous inputs of the education production

function, but it is increasingly common to predict over
expansion in the hiring and associated funding of admin
istrative positions. A testable hypothesis is then that the
greater is monopoly power of public school systems, the
greater is administrative over-expansion which leads to
lower academic performance.
Anderson et al. (1991) take the monopoly model a step
further with the prediction that administrators prefer to
over-expand by hiring additional non-teachers over
teachers because the latter enjoy higher autonomy and
are therefore more di� cult for administrators to control.
Expansion of secretaries and clerks are also hypothesized
to provide non-pecuniary income to administrators in the
form of services. Non-teachers are also less organized than
teachers which creates less trouble for administrators
because unions attempt to mandate work rules and hiring
practices that favour teachers. Finally, because teachers are
often tenurable, they enjoy relatively high autonomy from
administrators. Empirical investigation of cross-state vari
ations in 1984 reveal support for their predictions since
states with relatively large educational bureaucracies tend
to perform relatively poorly on standardized tests and also
tend to have relatively high dropout rates. They also ® nd
that greater employment of non-teachers and aides exert
negative eŒects on performance, but teachers exert positive
eŒects on performance.
However, it should be noted that non-optimal alloca
tions of educational inputs do not necessarily indicate pres
ence of an inverse relation between administrative
resources and performance. As Brewer (1996) discusses,
too many administrators may be re¯ ected in diverse
ways. In an extreme version, an inverse relation between
administrative resources and performance exists, as when
their employment is characterized by marginal products
below zero, and therefore, simple scaling-back of adminis
trators raises total product or performance. Under this
version, a negative coe� cient on administrative employ
ment would be found in a regression explaining perform
ance. A weaker version has administrators not exerting
direct negative eŒects on total performance, but nonethe
less they are less productive than other inputs such as
teachers. Shifting a dollar at the margin from administra 
tors to teachers raises performance, but note that this
weaker version of unproductive administration does not
indicate an inverse relationship between administrators
and performance since marginal products are positive.
But, the positive marginal in¯ uence of another dollar
spent on teachers or other inputs exceeds that of adminis
trators under this weaker version as would be evidenced by
diŒerences in estimated coe� cients (divided by their sal
aries) in regression equations. Brewer (1996) ® nds little
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consistent evidence of statistically signi® cant eŒects of
school administration on educational performance in his
study of 700 New York school districts over 1978± 1987.9

I I I . O T H E R R E A S O N S F O R I N E F FI C I E N C Y
While it may be true that ine� cient allocation of adminis
trators causes poor performance, not all ine� cient alloca
tions are necessarily a product of bureaucratic monopoly
power. There are various reasons apart from self-serving
behaviour for why administrators may be poorly allocated
in public school systems. One possibility stems from equal
ization policies that attempt to distribute funding equally
across locations, but are not tied to optimal resource allo
cation. For instance, equalization will not tend to promote
more teachers-assistant s in area A simply because they are
relatively cheap or more productive and discourage hiring
of teachers-assistant s in area B simply because they are
relatively more expensive and less productive. Although
such allocations would be e� cient, it is questionable that
equalization mandates focus on providing more e� cient
resource allocations. It is more likely that equalization
eŒorts focus on providing funding that creates uniformity
in teacher± student ratios and other parameters that are
believed to be strongly linked to academic performance.
However, as previously argued, with diŒerences in input
prices and marginal products there is no reason to suspect
that uniformity in teacher± student ratios would re¯ ect
optimal allocations across schools. Moreover, there
appears to be little evidence that such input ratios are
systematically linked to student performance.10 This dis
cussion suggests that equalization eŒorts may mandate
ine� cient input combinations and therefore contribute to
poorer academic performance. Mandates may create too
few or too many administrators and in this way exert an
independent eŒect on allocation of administrators (as well
as other inputs) that in¯ uences the relationship between
administrators and academic performance and is apart
from how equalization may create monopoly power that
administrators exploit by over-expanding their domain.
Public pressures to limit administrators, but expand
teachers or other inputs, may cause ine� cient resource
allocation as well. In 1996, California approved a classsize reduction initiative that in eŒect raises the hiring prior
ity of teachers. If such policies are inconsistent with
improved resource allocation, then another reason for inef
® ciency arises that is unrelated to monopoly powers of
9

school bureaucracies. Note that these policies may cause
a positive empirical relation between administrators (or
other inputs) and performance when schools that are not
subject to such pressures allocate e� cient levels of admin
istrators that exceed areas under pressure to hire too few
administrators. This scenario suggests that greater num
bers of administrators are positively related to performance
and therefore provides a counter-hypothesi s to the extreme
version that predicts a negative relationship between
administrators and performance.
Finally, because resource reallocations arise in response
to many factors such as changes in input prices, productiv
ity (technology), budgets, as well as public perceptions and
laws, changes take time to fully occur. Reallocations may
be especially transitory during times of signi® cant econ
omic distress of the order that California experienced in
the early to mid-1990s. Although temporary, resource allo
cations in any particular year are not necessarily e� cient,
and therefore we must be careful not to conclude that ex
amination of one or more year’s of data necessarily indi
cates steady-state equilibrium relationships between
administrators and performance. California appears to be
playing `catch-up’ with students± teacher ratios and other
input-related parameters and therefore this examination of
the 1992± 1993 relationships are not necessarily long-term
relationships nor are they necessarily indicative of relation
ships in other states.

I V . EM P L O Y E E A N D P E R F O R M A N C E
EQ U A T I O N S
Relationships between employees and performance are ex
amined using counties in California as the unit of observa
tion. The basic hypothesis is that monopoly power expands
hiring beyond e� cient levels, which then in¯ uences per
formance of public schools. This paper focuses on employ
ees as the vehicle for bureaucratic over-expansion and
separately considers three types of employees: administra 
tors, teachers, and non-teachers. The following models of
cross-county school employment and performance are
estimated:
EMPLOYEEi ˆ f … HERFi ; DISTRICTSi ; DENSITYi † … 1†
PERFi ˆ f … EMPLOYEEi ; HERFi ; DENSITYi ; TAKERi ;
EDUCATIONi † :

… 2†

where EMPLOYEEi ˆ administrators , or teachers, or
non-teachers, per primary and secondary student,

Brewer (1996) suggests a third version based on the hypothesis that adverse eŒects on performance will be exerted more often by central
administrators than local administrators. This is consistent with the Brennan and Buchanan (1971) hypothesis that argues that cen
tralization of government promotes its over-expansion. Brewer (1996) ® nds some support for this third hypothesis that predicts that the
greater the number of central administrators, the lower is overall performance.
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HERFi ˆ Her® ndahl index score for student enrolment by
school district; DISTRICTSi ˆ number of school districts
per 1000 students; DENSITYi ˆ population density, popu
lation divided by square miles; PERFi ˆ verbal or math
SAT scores, or dropout rates; TAKERi ˆ percentage
of
high
school
seniors
taking
the
SAT;
EDUCATIONi ˆ median number of years of schooling.
The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method is
used to estimate the parameters of the system of employ
ment and performance equations by accounting for con
temporaneous correlation in the errors across equations.
This is a recursive model that consists of a series of en
dogenous variables that are considered as a group because
they appear to bear a close conceptual relationship to one
another. Employment and performance measures are often
grouped together as indicators of public school perform
ance by both the public and educators and therefore the
SUR technique appears to be appropriate here.
Relationships between these equations are indicated when
the error terms of these equations are correlated and, in
this case, the SUR model allows for more e� cient estimates
than would arise under estimation by ordinary least
squares. 11
Six equations are estimated since there are three types of
employment (teachers, non-teachers, and administrators)
and three performance measures (math SAT, verbal SAT,
and drop out rates). Data for these variables are available
for most of the 57 counties for 1992 and 1993, and the
system of equations are estimated separately for each
year. Two sparsely populated counties did not participate
in many of the data collection eŒorts of the California
Department of Education. Signi ® cance of estimated coe� 
cients is based on two-tailed tests at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
levels.
Unless otherwise indicated, raw data are provided by the
California Department of Education and usually was avail
able at the level of school districts. These data were aggre
gated to the county level and then compiled into a master
® le with data collected from other sources. Data at the
county level collected from the California Statistical
Abstract of 1996 are: population, area in square miles,
and median numbers of years of schooling. All data are
available for 1992 and 1993, except for median education,
which was only available for 1990. It is appropriate to use
counties as the unit of observation since school districts in
California are organized and overseen by county superin
tendents. Therefore, while there are various numbers of
school districts within each county, they all come under
the same superintendent, or central administrative o� ce.12
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All counties operate under similar equalization eŒorts that
are administered at the state level, and the data aggregation
allows consideration of the variation that is measured
across counties, but at the same time, intergovernmenta l
or interschool competition is measured within each county
by the Her® ndahl score.
Equation 1 shows the hypothesized determinants of
three measures of school employees: administrators,
teachers, and non-teachers.13 Three measures are consid
ered so as to investigate whether greater monopoly power
exerts diŒerential eŒects on diŒerent employee classi® ca
tions. Previous discussion suggests that such a breakdown
is appropriate. Anderson et al. (1991) argue that bureau
cracy theory predicts that administrators prefer to hire
non-teachers over teachers, and the breakdown into three
types of employees allows examination of whether diŒer
ential eŒects are displayed. Previous discussion also indi
cated that an ine� cient allocation of employees does not
necessarily require a negative relationship between admin
istrators, or other employees, and performance. Rather,
ine� ciency may be present even though marginal products
are positive, and reallocation from one input to another
raises performance. This model allows one to determine
if one or more employee classi® cations yields, at the mar
gin, higher gains in performance than another classi® ca
tion.
The Her® ndahl index score is the sum of squares of
school districts’ total enrolment within a school district.
Borland and Howsen (1992, 1993) use Her® ndahl scores
to measure intergovernmental competition and ® nd that
less concentration is related to higher performance of pub
lic schools. In Equation 1 it is hypothesized that higher
levels of concentration lead to greater monopoly power
that enables over-expansion of employment. The
Her® ndahl score based on 12th grade enrolment was also
measured but because it did not alter the empirical results,
those estimations are not be displayed here. Numbers of
school districts is expected to exert a positive eŒect on
employment based on the assumption that greater scale
economies associated with centralization of supply are
signi® cant and therefore more districts require more
employees ± especially administrators and non-teaching
staŒ. Population density is anticipated to exert a positive
in¯ uence on employment based on the assumption that
urban areas have greater problems associated with crime
and congestion, and a greater number of non-English
speaking students that require more employees than rural
areas.

As Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991: 310) discuss, SUR estimation is basically a two-stage estimation procedure that results in consistent
and asymptotically e� cient estimates.
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reliable data on education levels and population densities for over 1000 school districts in each of two years.
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services staŒ, and special services staŒ.

The determinants of the three measures of performance
are listed in Equation 2. These measures are the Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT) scores on verbal and math tests and
the dropout rate. As discussed above, the eŒects of num
bers of employees on performance are ambiguous. The
extreme version of the monopoly model hypothesizes a
negative eŒect whereby higher employment lowers per
formance and is often expressed for the administrative
component of employment. However, a weaker version
of the monopoly model hypothesizes that positive eŒects
of employment on performance also provide evidence of
the monopoly model when marginal products divided by
resource prices of administrators are below those of other
staŒ. The hypothesized sign on the employee variable is
therefore an empirical question to be resolved by the data.
The Her® ndhal score is expected to exert a negative
in¯ uence on performance based on the monopoly model
that predicts that greater monopoly power allows em
ployees to pursue their interests at the expense of higher
performance. Population density is expected to exert a
negative in¯ uence on performance because of the common
perception that urban areas have more problems that
might negatively in¯ uence performance (e.g. crime, conges
tion, unemployment, and poverty) than rural areas. The
percentage of high school seniors taking SAT tests is
expected to exert a negative in¯ uence on test scores because
a higher test-taking pool means that more lower-aptitude
students are included in the pool. Median education is
expected to be positively related to performance based
on the expectation that higher educational achievement
of parents /communities positively in¯ uences academic
achievement of public school students.
Table 1 displays summary statistics of the variables from
the pooled sample. A few observations follow. Average
employees per student ratios are 0.003 (administrators) ,
0.049 (teachers), and 0.007 (non-teachers). There are
roughly 333 students per administrator, 20 students per
teacher, and 143 students per non-teacher. SAT verbal
scores exhibit an average of 419 (out of a possible 800),
with a range of 456 to 364. SAT math scores exhibit an

average of 476, with a range of 528 to 419. Dropout rates
range from 0± 8% , with a mean of 3.65% . Her® ndahl
scores average 0.295 and range from 1.0± 0.056.

Estimation of the 1992 equation
Table 2 displays SUR estimations of employment and per
formance equations for 1992. The ® rst column displays
estimation of the teachers per student equation. The
Her® ndahl score exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and
signi® cant in¯ uence on numbers of teachers thus providing
evidence that market power results in higher use of
teachers. Numbers of school districts exerts a positive, as
hypothesized, and signi® cant in¯ uence on teachers. No
in¯ uence is exerted by population density. The second col
umn displays estimation of the non-teachers per student
equation. The Her® ndahl score does not exert a signi® cant
in¯ uence on numbers of non-teachers, while numbers of
school districts exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and sig
ni® cant in¯ uence on non-teachers. No in¯ uence is exerted
by population density. The third column displays estima
tion of the administrators per student equation. The
Her® ndahl score exerts a positive, as expected, signi® cant
in¯ uence on numbers of administrators, and numbers of
school districts exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and
signi® cant in¯ uence on administrators . Density exerts a
signi® cant negative eŒect on administrators ± an eŒect
opposite to expectations.
Column 4 displays estimation of the verbal SAT score
equation. Teacher and non-teacher variables do not exert
signi® cant eŒects, but number of administrators exerts a
positive eŒect on scores thus indicating that counties with
more administrators tend to exhibit higher scores. The
Her® ndahl score exerts a positive (unexpected) and signi® 
cant eŒect on verbal SAT scores. Population density exerts
a negative (as expected) and signi® cant in¯ uence on verbal
scores. Percentage of seniors taking SAT tests exerts the
expected negative and signi® cant in¯ uence on verbal
scores. Median education exerts the expected positive and
signi® cant in¯ uence on verbal scores.

Table 1. Summary statistics
Variable

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

STD.DEV

Administrators per student
Teachers per student
Non-teachers per student
SAT verbal
SAT math
Droput rate
Her® ndahl score
Districts per student
Population density
% seniors taking SAT test
Median education

0.003
0.049
0.007
419
476
3.65
0.295
0.001
587.87
33.11
13.22

0.00005
0.002
0.001
364
419
0
0.056
0.00003
1.62
16.84
12.20

0.008
0.083
0.013
456
528
8
1.00
0.005
16 002
61.57
15.40

0.0011
0.009
0.001
22.12
27.90
1.60
0.288
0.001
2126.39
9.71
0.64

Table 2. SUR Estimates of employmen t and performanc e equations in 1992

Constant

Teachers

Non-teachers

Administrators

0.04 a
53.33

0.01 a
25.86

0.002 a
17.65

0.01 a
3.90
5.14 a
10.97
7E-08
0.27

0.001
0.77
0.59 a
3.78
75E-08
0.63

0.001 a
4.05
0.64a
8.80
78E-08 b
2.13

Teachers
Non-teachers
Administrators
Her® ndahl
Districts
Density
Takers
Median education
Adj. R2
s.e.e.
n
Notes:

a;b;c

0.72
0.0039
57

0.20
0.001
57

0.66
0.001
57

SATV

SATM

71440.50 b
2.39
874.59
1.43
73067.72
1.33
6431.05 c
1.76
17.00 b
2.26

7219.09 a
3.15
591.30
0.08
7454.80
0.17
730.19
0.01
22.48 b
2.53

70.01a
4.60
71.62 a
4.52
43.32 a
9.34
0.60
14.22
57

70.001
1.12
72.22 a
5.26
55.91 a
10.18
0.64
16.73
57

Dropout
14.42 a
3.77
75.70
0.14
301.81 c
1.90
7952.95 a
2.72
70.12
0.17
0.0002 b
2.19
70.75 a
2.62
0.32
1.34
57

refer to signi® cance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels.

Column 5 displays estimation of the math SAT score
equation. No employment category exerts a signi® cant
eŒect on scores. The Her® ndahl score exerts a positive
(unexpected) and signi® cant eŒect on math SAT scores.
Percentage of seniors taking SAT tests exerts the expected
negative and signi® cant in¯ uence on verbal scores. Median
education exerts the expected positive and signi ® cant in¯ u
ence on verbal scores.
Column 6 displays estimation of the dropout equation.
While teachers do not exert a signi® cant eŒect on dropout
rates, non-teachers (positive) and administrators (negative)
exert sign® cant eŒects. That is, higher numbers of nonteachers appear to raise dropout rates, while higher num
bers of administrators lower dropout rates. Population
density exerts a positive and signi ® cant eŒect on dropout
rates, and median education exerts a negative, as hypothe
sized, and signi® cant eŒect on dropout rates.
Estimation of the 1993 equation
Table 3 displays SUR estimations of employment and per
formance equations for 1993. The ® rst column displays
estimation of the teachers± student equation. The
Her® ndahl score exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and
signi® cant in¯ uence on numbers of teachers thus providing
evidence that market power results in higher use of
teachers. Numbers of school districts exerts a positive, as
hypothesized, and signi® cant in¯ uence on teachers. No
in¯ uence is exerted by population density. The second col
umn displays estimation of the non-teachers per student
equation. The Her® ndahl score does not exert a signi® cant

in¯ uence on numbers of non-teachers, while numbers of
school districts exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and sig
ni® cant in¯ uence on non-teachers. No in¯ uence is exerted
by population density. The third column displays estima
tion of the administrators± student equation. The
Her® ndahl score exerts a positive, as expected, signi® cant
in¯ uence on numbers of administrators, and numbers of
school districts exerts a positive, as hypothesized, and sig
ni® cant in¯ uence on administrators. Density exerts a sig
ni® cant negative eŒect on administrators ± an eŒect
opposite to expectations. With the exception of density
exerting a signi® cant eŒect on numbers of administrators
(versus no eŒect in 1992), the results of the ® rst three
columns mirror those found in 1992.
Column 4 displays estimation of the verbal SAT score
equation. Teachers do not exert signi® cant eŒects (as in
1992), but numbers of non-teachers exert a negative eŒect
on verbal scores (versus no eŒect in 1992). As in 1992,
numbers of administrators exert a positive eŒect on verbal
scores. Unlike the positive and signi ® cant eŒect in 1992, the
Her® ndahl score does not exert a signi® cant eŒect on ver
bal SAT scores. As in 1992, population density exerts a
negative and signi® cant in¯ uence, the percentage of seniors
taking SAT tests exerts negative and signi® cant in¯ uence,
and median education exerts the expected positive and sig
ni® cant in¯ uence on verbal scores.
Column 5 displays estimation of the math SAT score
equation. No employment category exerts a signi® cant
eŒect on math scores ± thus mirroring results in 1992.
Contrary to 1992, the Her® ndahl score no longer exerts a
positive and signi® cant eŒect on math SAT scores. Density

Table 3. SUR Estimates of employmen t and performanc e equations in 1993

Constant

Teachers

Non-teachers

Administrators

0.04 a
24.16

0.01 a
18.12

0.002 a
10.39

0.01 b
2.48
5.31 a
6.42
9E-07
0.62

0.001
0.73
0.51 a
2.77
73E-07
0.92

0.001 a
3.32
0.59 a
6.06
77E-08
0.35

Teachers
Non-teachers
Administrators
Her® ndahl
Districts
Density
Takers
Median education
Adj. R2
s.e.e.
n
Notes:

a;b;c

0.48
0.007
53

0.15
0.001
53

0.52
0.001
53

SATV
7116.43 b
2.26
411.00
1.04
73982.94 c
1.81
11 866.06 a
3.57
1.78
0.23
70.01b
2.03
71.40 a
5.51
42.40 a
10.39
0.60
13.70
53

SATM
7121.25 b
2.23
7349.10
0.84
1969.85
0.85
75.395.09
1.53
72.60
0.32
0.01c
1.80
71.51 a
5.65
47.80 a
11.13
0.75
14.05
53

Dropout
14.85 b
3.39
19.33
0.56
153.32
0.89
7995.93 a
3.26
70.63
0.76
0.0002
0.81
70.78 a
2.43
0.28
1.44
53

refer to signi® cance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels.

exerts a positive and signi® cant eŒect, versus no eŒect in
1992. As in 1992, percentage of seniors taking SAT tests
(negative) and median education (positive) exert signi® cant
in¯ uences on verbal scores.
Column 6 displays estimation of the dropout equation.
As in 1992, teachers do not exert a signi® cant eŒect. But,
while non-teachers exerted a positive, but weakly signi® 
cant, eŒect in 1992, it no longer exerts a signi® cant eŒect.
However, as in 1992, numbers of administrators exert a
negative and signi® cant eŒect on dropout rates. Unlike
its positive and signi® cant eŒect in 1992, population den
sity does not signi® cantly in¯ uence dropout rates. Finally,
median education continues to exert a negative and signi® 
cant eŒect on dropout rates.

V. C ONCLUSIONS
The hypothesis that monopoly power of school districts
allows bureaucratic expansion and poor academic perform
ance has been tested in the public school system of
California. Evidence indicates that monopoly power is
positively associated with employment of administrators
and teachers, thus supporting the bureaucratic expansion
hypothesis. No support is found for the case of nonteachers.
The hypotheses that higher employment of teachers and
administrators exert negative eŒects on performance, as
measured by SAT scores and dropout rates, are not sup

ported. Variation in numbers of teachers does not explain
any variation in performance measures. However, higher
employment of administrators is found to raise verbal SAT
scores and lower drop out rates. Higher numbers of nonteachers are also found to lower verbal SAT scores (in
1993) and raise drop out rates (in 1992), thus providing
some evidence that this employment group exerts negative
eŒects on performance. The evidence appears to suggest
that California public schools hire too few administrators
and too many non-teachers, based on the prediction that
greater numbers of administrators and fewer non-teachers
would raise verbal SAT scores and lower drop out rates.
The evidence also indicates that performance diŒerences
are unrelated to variation in numbers of teachers ± thus
suggesting that the public push towards smaller class sizes
may not raise student achievement.
While misallocation of sta� ng resources may suggest
bureaucratic over-expansion , this result simply indicates
that staŒresources are misallocated in the California pub
lic school system. Bureaucracy theory is one model that
explains resource misallocation, but others reasons may
also explain why too many non-teachers and too few
administrators appear to be hired. As just mentioned, ris
ing public pressures that place hiring priorities on teachers
may crowd-out non-teachers and administrators.
Equalization policies may also contribute to resource
misallocation when funding decisions focus on spending
equality, which is not necessarily related to performance
equality across schools and school districts. Public pres

sures on hiring more teachers and spending equalization
policies may therefore in¯ uence resource allocation and,
because they do not emanate from competitive pri
vate market pressures, they do not necessarily re¯ ect e� 
ciency-enhancing reallocations of school resources. The
weak California economy in 1992± 1993 may also have
played a role in misallocation that may be resolved over
time.
From a public policy viewpoint, this paper suggests that
a focus ± either by the public or policymakers ± on teacher±
student ratios is not necessarily the most productive means
of fostering higher performance in our public school
systems. As previously discussed, e� cient resource alloca
tion does not necessarily result in uniform teacher± student
ratios across schools since marginal products, input prices,
and budgets vary across schools. Public pressures and/or
policymakers that force uniformity may contribute to
lower overall performance when `magic’ formulae for
teacher± student ratios are promoted. It should also be
noted that variation of sta� ng across schools does not
necessarily indicate bureaucratic over-expansion since vari
ation may simply be a product of schools trying to adopt
their uniquely e� cient hiring ratios, or a product of public
pressures to hire more teachers, equalization policies, or a
weak economy. Moreover, it is di� cult to know what con
stitutes e� cient sta� ng decisions when private market
counterparts that must endure the competitive pressures
of the marketplace are fairly weak or absent. When
employment is related to monopoly power, Niskanen’s
theory of bureaucracy predicts that public school staŒ
operate at relatively high levels of autonomy from sponsors
due to substantial monitoring costs and lack of private
market counterparts with which to make comparisons of
such items as costs and performance. Sponsors are there
fore likely to ® nd oversight a relatively di� cult endeavour
and it should not be surprising that arguments for higher
funding are di� cult to assess since they may be selfinterested attempts to over-expan d or genuine attempts
to improve educational performance in least-cost manners.
However, given high monitoring costs and lack of com
parative information in private markets, sponsor-focus
on teacher± student ratios may be rational since it is a fairly
easy statistic to view and compare across other public
schools. Unfortunately, this paper provides evidence that
even if rational for sponsors, reallocations towards other
inputs such as administrators and away from teachers and
non-teachers may oŒer more promise for performance
gains.
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